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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper Is to evaluate the Organizational
Effectiveness (OE) program in the United States Army.

Section one

describes the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Program, and
ei^lains the training and goals of the program.
The second section reviews research conducted by the Army
which showed a need for OE.

It also explains why OE is an important

aspect in developing better managerial, leadership, and organiza
tional capabilities in the Army.
The third section describes a survey conducted by the United
States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS).
The survey served as the source of evidence for this paper, there
fore, methodology and methodological problems of using secondary
resources will be described in this section.
The fourth section describes factors that will increase the
program's level of success based on the results of the OECS survey,
and the questionnaires that they sent out.

This section also con

tains information that was obtained by telephone from Organizational
Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs) working at various posts through
out the Army.

This section also describes factors that affect the

success or failure of OE operations.

The accomplishments in Organi

zational Development (OD) in the civilian sector of American society
are noted, and the various methods used to overcome problems similar
to OE are analyzed.

This section also describes OE techniques and

compares them to civilian techniques of OD.

In this way I hope to

determine what the Army can gain from civilian OD expertise.
The fifth section gives concrete recommendations for
enhancing the Army's OE program, and some concluding thoughts con
cerning the effectiveness and efficiency of OE.

Section 1
Organizational Effectiveness Is a program used to evaluate the
management and leadership climate of any size unit In the United
States Army.
beings.

It Is "a process that leads to treating people as human

It Is the understanding that people are an Important part of

an organization's day-to-day activities."^

Through attention to Its

organizational effectiveness, the Army hopes to Improve morale,
motivation, commitment, development of Its soldiers, and most Impor
tantly, Its combat readiness.
Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Is a fairly new concept In the
Army, but In actuality It Is a systematic adaptation of the technique
used and commmonly referred to as organizational development (OD) In
the civilian community.

A definition of OE:

Organizational Effectiveness (OE) is the systematic
military application of selected management and
behavioral science skills and methods to Improve
how the total organization functions to accomplish
assigned missions and Increase combat readiness.
It Is applicable to organizational processes
(Including training In Interpersonal skills) and
when applied by a commander within an organization.
Is tailored to the unique needs of the organization
and normally Implemented with the assistance of an
organizational effectiveness staff officer (OESO).^
The organizational effectiveness concept and the OESO provide a
consulting capability to all commanders and supervisors who wish to
use It.

Organizational agencies are mandatory in the sense that they

must be established on major Army Installations and that they be
available for those commanders and supervisors who wish to use them.
It Is however, strictly voluntary for commanders and supervisors to
ask for OESO consulting expertise.
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The clients, or those that request the consulting advice of the
OESO, are supervisors, staff officers, or commanders who have a prob
lem in their area of responsibility, and seek help in solving those
problems.

The problems can be specific, general, or unknown.

Many

of the common problems in the past have been in organizational areas
such as planning, control, influence, or leadership.
Organizational Effectiveness staff officers volunteer for train
ing and are carefully selected.

The selection requirements for Army

officers are as follows:
- Grade of captain, major, or lieutenant colonel.
- Assigned, or projected for assignment, to an authorized
OESO cast 52) position.
- Graduate of an Officer Advance course.
- Baccalaureate-level college degree, preferably with
a major concentration in one of the behavioral or
management sciences.
- Promotion potential to the next higher grade.
3
- Troop eaq>erience at platoon, company, or higher level.
The Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer Course (OESOC) is
a 16-week course conducted at the Fort Ord Training Center in
California.

The first regular course was started in January 1976.

The course provides intensive training in behavioral science and
theories pertaining to management and leadership, but these do, how
ever, focus on military organizations.
namics are studied in great detail.
systems approach:

Organization theory and dy

Students are taught to use the

that is, they learn to observe and study the inter-
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dependent aspects of the entire organization.

A brief explanation

of the course is as follows:
The course is based on experience or practical
application, and more than 25 percent of the course
tine is spent in field training— consulting or
teaching a military unit— on various posts, under
the supervision of a qualified instructor. Instructor
qualification is in itself unique. A highly selected
staff of PhD's and practicing consultants have been
drawn together to provide the instruction. In addi
tion, veil known author-consultants such as Dr. Paul
Hersey, Dr. Tony Tiley, Dr. John Sherwood, Dr. Gus
Economous, Dr. John Jones, Dr. Stan Herman, and others
are brought in to present portions of the course. In
addition to consulting skills, students experience and
then are taught to facilitate a 1-week leadership and
management development course, which has gained great
popularity among middle managers.^
Training of OESOs will be stressed because it will be an
important variable when attempting to determine the efficiency of the
program.

The OESO is trained to be a fair and impartial advisor to

the client who seeks his aid.

Although the OESOC lasts only 16

weeks, it is academically demanding and of excellent quality.

Many

who have graduates from the course have stated that it is the best
learning experience they have ever had— including all military
schooling through C6SC (Command and General Staff College) level and
graduate school.^
The OE process works in a four step activity.

When an OESO is

invited to act as a consultant he will first assess the unit, then
help the client plan for change, next he will help implement the
change, and finally he will follow up or evaluate the changes that
occurred in order to determine the success of OE.
The OESO can assess the unit in several different ways and
methods.

"These methods include the use of historical data.
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observation, individual interviews, group interviews, questionnaires,
surveys, or any combination of these methods."^
Some of the organizational processes that OESOs are generally
interested in are:
-

Communication
Motivation
Goal integration
Planning
Decisions
Leadership
Coordination
Control
Influence
Conflict management

After the assessment has been made, the OESO then provides feed
back to the commander, or to the client who requested the help.
back is given in a nonjudgmental way:

Feed

the OESO does not tell the

client what to do, but rather what problems the OESO has found.
Often the client has already informed the OESO what problems he is
having, but wants a method to overcome the problem.

For instance, a

commander may feel he has a communications problem, but he does not
know where the filters to communication exist.

It is therefore the

OESO's responsibility to determine where and why these filters to
communication occur.
When the feedback period occurs, the data provided are anonymous.
The client is not informed where the information came from.
data feedback is confidential.

Also, the

It is the client's choice whether or

not to pass the information iq> or down the chain of command.

Often

the OESO will try to persuade the client to pass the information down
the chain of command in order to improve the organizational process
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and open up communication. As the OE reference book states:
"Sharing the same Information up the chain of command is a different
story— depending on who Is up there— and the OESO will not attempt to
g

Influence a client In that area."
The second stage, the planning stage, Is more prescriptive In
nature.

During this stage the client and OESO decide how to rectify

the problems found during the assessment phase.

The client will

inform the OESO what he is able and willing to do (generally deter
mined by time and resources available to the client and the per
ceived importance of the problem).

The OESO will inform the client

what should be accomplished and how it should be accomplished (nor
mally based on the OESO's experience and knowledge of organizational
theory).

There are many ways this planning stage can go.

Some of

the more typical methods planned for use are:
-

Team building
Communications training
Role clarification
Time management
Performance counseling training
Meeting management
Transition workshops
Leadership and management development course
Problem solving
Conflict resolution
Intergroup cooperation
Goal clarification .
Process observation

During the implementation stage normally one or more of the
above methods are used to overcome problems.

The client, during this

stage, is directly involved and takes on the role of the leader,
planner, coordinator, and innovator of the process.

The OESO, on the
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other hand, functions as a third party negotiator of the groups.
He may serve as an exhaust valve gmahl lag the
client to let off steam; as a radiator absorbing
some of the heat of the controversy, as the
shock absorber when the going gets rough; or as
the fog lamps when the future is hazy. The
consultant may fulfill a variety of functions.
But one thing he is not; he is not the driver.
His responsibility is to help his client...10
The last stage of the process is the evaluation and follow-up
period.

This can be done weeks or months after the third stage.

It

is initiated in order to determine the effects of the previous action
and to determine if the client requires more consultation.
The OESO's goal is to help the mend>ers of the organization to
be both self-sufficient and more efficient.
no authority.

The OESO has absolutely

His effectiveness as a consultant is solely derived

from his expertise, knowledge, personality, and his ability to per
suade the client that a managerial change is necessary.

The client's

authority is based on his legal responsibility for everything his
organization does or fails to do.
entirely on his noetic ability.

The OESO's authority is based
The OESO is totally responsible to

the client who requested his assistance.

He is not authorized, and

in fact, is forbidden to report his findings up the chain of command.
When an OESO is requested to provide consulting services there
are many aspects of the organization that he must analyze and study.
He will observe the structure, mission, technology, and personnel of
the unit.
Most missions of Army combat units are normally not difficult to
ascertain during war time, but during peace time it is more difficult.
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The OESO must detëmlne vhst thé mission of the unit Is In order to
determine hov successful the imlt Is, or why It has been unsuccess^
ful.
When studying personnel of the unlt/organlzatlon the OESO
determines how people Interact In their work and training.

The OESO

analyzes such Interaction as cooperation, support, mission accom
plishment, effective communication, appropriate decision, and commit
ment toward organizational goals.
Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers determine the
structure of the unit by studying the Table of Allowances which pro
vides the number of personnel authorized by position.

He analyzes

the Table of Equipment to determine If the equipment authorized Is on
hand and adequate for mission accomplishment.

When studying the

formal structure, the OESO also studies the Informal structure.

He

analyzes, for Instance, who haé the commander's confidence and why.
He attempts to clarify and use the Informal structure to the organi
zation's advantage.
The OESO must observe the technology of the organization to
Insure mission acconpllshment.

Included in this technology observa

tions are "equipment, the machinery, the tools used to do the job,
the physical facilities, the work space, the language used to counsel
or inform, how Information Is passed, how messages are handled, the
way a unit goes about getting resources, and so f o r t h . T e c h n o 
logical effectiveness can be observed In many ways by the OESO and
often It Is related to administrative efficiency.
The OESO must also determine the environment of the organization
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under study.

He must analyze higher headquarters requirements,

other major headquarters requirements, and even the Interactions
that transpire between the organization and the civilian community.
The OESO will study and observe the chain of command to Include offi
cers and key noncdmmlssloned officers.

"Individually and collec

tively, these people are Involved In some capacity with the com
mander In setting goals and objectives, establishing plans, super
vising, directing, training, and developing the unit in general.
The OE manual^s summary of organizational effectiveness states:
It Is not an approach to say, 'Let us do some
thing to make the troops 'feel' better.' It Is
a management approach that considers the people
aspect of an organization in perspective with
other critical elements. The real focus is on
improving the organization's ability to accomplish
its mlselon. If people 'feel better' after an OE
operation, that's good but it's not the reason
on which an OE operation is based.
Before explaining the steps that an OESO takes in determining
organizational problems and solutions to those problems it is neces
sary to explain the assumptions, goals, and conditions that must be
accepted to Individuals before the process can be helpful.

The

following is taken from the Organizational Effectiveness Reference
Book, published by the United States Army Command and General Staff
College:
Assumptions
- Commanders have the responsibility for insuring that
all decisions are consistent with mission accomplishment.
- Commanders have the responsibility for Insuring that
decisions are supported by understandable goals.
- Groups of Individuals are the building blocks of an
organization.

- Personal commitment to goals is more than Just personal
agreement with goals.
- The performance of soldiers Is directly Influenced by
the way they are managed/led.
- Commands function more effectively when individual and
command goals are aligned.
- Soldiers support best those things they are a part of.
Goals. Given these assumptions about soldiers In
organizations, the goal of OE Is to enhance those
activities In the command that will result In:
- Informed and Involved soldiers.
- Alignment of Individual and organizational goals.
- Forward planning— better management of time.
- More realistic/achievable objectives.
- Continuous two-way flow of accurate Information.
- Greater cooperation within the command.
- A climate where problems and differences are
effectively dealt with and resolved.
- Management/leadership by goals more than controls.
- Timely and more widely accepted command decisions.
- A command that responds effectively to change.
Conditions. For the OE process to be successful In an
organization, certain conditions must exist. There must
be:
- Command commitment to initiate the OE process and to
continue the process once begun.
- Command willingness to allow groups to be a part of the
planning process.
- Command willingness to accept feed back (usually per
ceived as a personal risk).
- Command commitment to provide the necessary resources to
support the process.
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Sectlôn II
We may ask why OE Is important to the United States Army.

The

following reasons are by no means all^inclnsive; however, it does
provide us with an understanding of why OE can benefit the United
States A m y .
1.

With the all-volunteer Army we no longer have unlimited

manpower resources.

Army managers must be taught to carefully and

wisely use people resources.
2.

In the 1970's pressure occurred from field commanders to

adopt some form of better managing and leadership techniques,
prompting the Army to initiate OE.^*
3.

Like all large government organizations, only limited funds

are available to the Army.

Army managers must, therefore, be taught

to use these funds for maximum return.
4.

A study conducted by the Army War College in the early

1970's dealing with professionalism and leadership showed a necessity
for OE.^7
5.

A behavioral science study conducted by the Office of the

Chief of Staff in the early 1970's showed that a program like OE was
required.^®
6.

Our society has changed a great deal in the last two

decades, and one must keep in mind that the United States Army
reflects our society.

Leadership and management techniques have

changed drastically in other organizations, but the Army has not
always kept pace.

The Organizational Effectiveness Program is a way
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to îise and understand these neir techniques and principles, and a
way to keep up with the rest of society.

If the A n y does not keep

up with society In the realm of leadership and management. It will
have more and more difficulties In attracting people to the all
volunteer force.
Since 1975, when about 200 OESOs were assigned to various Army
levels, evaluations have been periodically conducted in order to
ascertain the effectiveness, responsiveness, and acceptance of OE.
The last external evaluation was started on 31 June 1979.
has the results of that survey.
conducted.

This author

Later, It will explain how It was

After closely studying the results of the survey conducted,

I have been able to Identify many problem areas concerning OE In the
United States Army.
The most Important problem Is to determine if OE Is doing what
It is supposed to do.

Are people who have used the OESO more effec

tive in their organizational process than they were before they used
the OESO and the OE concept?
This paper Is an attempt to determine existing variables that
hinder the use and benefits of OE.

Variables such as:

interaction

among OESOs and senior officers, confidentiality of OESO's findings,
problem areas concerning the four step process, and the training
received by the OESOs.
This paper will compare problem areas In OE with problem areas
in civilian organizational development CPD).

An attempt %rlll be made

to ascertain the degree of similarity among these problems, and how
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civilians overcame the various problem areas they experienced.
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Section III
The results for this paper are In part taken from a survey and
evaluation conducted by the Directorate of Evaluation, United States
Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OBCS),
A questionnaire vas sent out to OESOs on 21 June 1979.
purpose vas to assess the OE program and curriculum.

Its

Almost all OE

students who graduated before 1979, and vho remained on active duty,
received a questionnaire.

January 1979 %ras the cut-x)ff to insure

that respondents had been in the field at least 6 months.

Four-

hundred and thirty-^even questionnaires vere mailed.
On 6 August 1979 an OE Key Manager and Supervisor Question
naire vas sent out.

It generally asked the same questions that vere

asked in the OESO questionnaire in ordcu: to "check their perceptions
against those of their OESOs and to get a sense of the climate for
OE from other than the OESO's perspective."^*

One-hundred eighty-

seven key managers questionnaires vere sent out based on OESO
on

questionnaire returns.
From 20 August to 12 October 1979, follov-up visits vere con
ducted .
Information vas sought through the techniques of
interviewing and observation to confirm and corro
borate survey results and provide insight into
subjective or qualitative aspects of the impact
of OE on OE users, senior officers, key managers
and OESOs themselves. During these visits a total
of 92 interviews were conducted and 192 people
were contacted.2^
Reliability and validity is normally a problem when analyzing
secondary resources, and the survey conducted by the OECS is no
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exception.

The questions asked often do not exactly measure the

variables wished to Be tested.

For Instance, the survey never

specifically asked or measured the confidentiality of the OESO's
findings.

The questionnaires did not ask either the OESO or the

key managers If the client's problems were always held In strictest
confidence.

What It did ask, however, was whether key managers knew

the results of OESO's findings.

From that question It could be

Inferred that confidentiality of the client's problems was not always
strictly adhered to.
There was also a slight problem determining the return rate of
the questionnaires.

Those responsible for the survey never stated

how many questionnaires were returned and why they believed they
were not returned.

A telephone call to officials at the OECS stated

that the return rate of the survey was only 42 percent for OESOs and
37 percent for key managers.

This Is a very low response rate, often

50 percent Is judged adequate.

22

cate a significant response bias.

The low response rate could Indi
Officials at the OECS stated, how

ever, that the return rate was low because many of the officers who
had been sent questionnaires had either left the Army, or were not
working In OE assignments.

From this author's experience In the

Army, this seems to be a most plausible reason; officers are often
rotated among jobs.
For those readers who question the reliability and validity
of the Army's survey and Its scientific value, would perhaps feel
more comfortable calling It a census.

However, whatever term Is
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desired. It would be useful to keep In mind that the trends and
fIndlnge discussed In this paper are not totally obtained from the
Army's own evaluation.

This author's finding and generalizations

are derived from various references, resources. Individual Inter
views, and his own personal military experience of twelve years.
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Section IV
This section is snb-dlvlded into nine areas of Importance
that will determine the criteria for success of OE operations in
the United States Army,
Key Managers Support of OE
1.

Because OESOs work for key managers who are often not

trained in OE, the key managers often do not understand its need or
importance.

If these key managers were aware of the importance of

OE, they would be more responsive to the needs of the OESO, and
would allow OESOs to work full time on duties that pertain to OE.
Additionally, the entire officer corps must comprehend the izq)ortance, benefits, and requirements of OE in order for it to be
successfully implemented at all levels of command.
The OESO survey reported that 47.6 percent of the key managers
had attended the 2-week Key Managers Course, but the key manager
samples reported only 29.41 percent h a d , ^

The reason for the dif

ference is that the same group of OESOs and key managers did not
always return the survey.

In other words, these figures are taken

from two different groups.

If key managers do not understand the

benefits derived from OE, they will not support their OESO's, and
often will assign them other duties well out of the realm of OE
functions.

In fact, "It is significant to note that one-third of

the responding OESOs reported spending 50 percent or less of their
time on OE activities."^*
All Army officers, regardless of their rank, must be educated
regarding the importance and function of OE.

If Army officers have
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some knovledge concerning the central aspects of OE, they will be
less resistant to the concept.

Bennls states;

,. we can predict that an anticipated change
will be resisted to the degree that the client
system possesses little or Incorrect knowledge
about the change, has relatively little trust
In the source of the change, and has compara
tively low Influence In controlling the nature
and direction of the change.
All officers must have some training concerning OE.

The com

manders at all levels In the unit must understand OE concepts.
Importance, and benefits.
most valuable asset toward
can then

If this occurs, then the OESO will be a
organizational effectiveness. The OESO

save a great deal of time with his knowledge and expertise

by guiding the unit commander In Instituting change, by reinforcing
the concept of OE, and by being more objective with problems inherent
in the unit
It should be noted that according to OECS officials there is a
2-week course designed solely for key managers of the OESO.

The pur

pose of the course Is to familiarize them with the salient features
of OE so that, at the very least, they might be able to recognize the
Importance of the program to the Army, and support It at their home
unit.
In order to educate possible clients and senior officers, the
Army also is teaching the concept of OE In all service schools, in
cluding the War College, Command and General Staff College, and the
Commander's Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

The Commander's Course

is limited to all officers who are selected for battalion level
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comwmd; therefore, all battalion éôonanders will have some knowl
edge of the theory and concepts of OE.
If OE were to be adopted by the entire officer corps» the
following would result:
(1)

Improved Interpersonal relations.

(2)

Tendency among people to listen to others.

C3)

Ifore spontaneous reaction of subordinates.

C4)

Greater Involvement at all levels.

(5)

Reduction In Interdepartment competitiveness.

C6)

More responsible management behavior.

(7)

More systematic analysis of problems.

(8)

More explanation and tolerance from bosses.

C9)

A reductioninthe frequency of crisis. 2?

An additional benefit of successful OE Implementation In the
Army would be the influence upon external forces.
Army is greatly affected by external forces.

The United States

These forces must not

only support the Army with funds to accomplish Its mission, but must
view the Army as an organization offering opportunity, challenge,
and a new approach to management and leadership.

The public must see

the Army as innovative, not totally authoritarian, and as a vehicle
for individual self-satisfaction and self-actualization.

The Army

would also offer a more viable option for career opportunities.
In order

for the Armyto be innovative and enhance its image,

it must reacha cross-section

of our society.

It must correctly

analyze the external social and political environment in order to
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change their Internal stmctnre.

Larry Greiner and Louis B a m e s

state;
Because the management of an organisation cannot
completely control its environment, they are con
tinually having to Introduce Internal organiza
tional changes which allow them to cope more
effectively with new challenges presented from
outside By increased competition, advances in
technology, new government legislation, and
pressing social demands. Most frequently organi
zational changes are introduced In 'reaction* to
these environmental pressures. This latter course,
while more difficult to pursue Because employees do
not recognize its immediate importance, is a stand
ard that can often Be applied to organizations that
lead rather than follow their industries. Such
'practice' organizations can Be said to engage in
attempting to change their environments as well as
themselves.
The Army has Been the prime mover in equal opportunities and
equal rights for all its memBers.

It can also, with the support from

the hierarchy. Be the front runner in Organizational Effectiveness
among Bureaucratic puBlic organizations in the United States.
Conf identiality
2.

Managers (clients) would Be more apt to request OE and OESO

consultants if they were assured of the confidentiality of the OESO's
findings.

Although it is Believed that most OESOs are very conscien

tious ahout observing this requirement, it is also suspected that the
key managers they work for have ways of knowing the results and of
passing them along to others (i.e., G-1 staff officer to division
commander).

When the questionnaire asked 66 key managers how often

OESOs shared documentation of OE activities with them, 13 said never,
3 said seldom, 9 said sometimes, 16 said usually, and 25 answered

20
_
29
always,
From the above Information it can be deduced that If key
managers know the findings of the OESO, they are apt to pass the
Information np the hierarchy.

Officers In the hierarchy, and those

especially at high command level, want to know how their subordinate
units are doing.
According to officials at the OECS at Fort Ord, California,
there Is not a problem with the OESO keeping his findings confiden
tial.

That Is not to say that OESOs are not under pressure to

divulge their findings.

Quite the contrary, high ranking officers

are putting a great deal of pressure on the OESOs and the school to
permit release of OESO findings.
Fort Ord OE officials state that confidentiality of OESO's docu
mentation policy may have to be revised because "senior officers at
Division level want to find out what Is happening down there."

As a

result, the school Is now releasing the general findings and trends
found In various units by releasing case studies.

Fort Ord officials

are also considering authorizing OESOs to release general findings
to high ranking officers (division or brigade level) concerning the
general problem areas and trends found at various levels In the com
mand.
In the Army, confidentiality might be more of a problem than In
other civilian organizations.

One reason for this Is that the OESO

works for someone normally higher in the hierarchy, and often the
OESO's efficiency report is written by him.

Even though the OESO Is

not to divulge any Information concerning his findings of his client's
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problems, hé may do so under preastire, to look good, or to enhance
his own poaltlon of Importance,

The problem concerning confiden

tiality Is then compounded By the fact that the client Is often
In the same hierarchy and will then have his efficiency report
written By the same Individual as the OESO,

No manager likes to have

his problem Be known to those of higher rank Because It may reflect
on his own efficiency.
Clients In fields other than the Army are also concerned with
the confidentiality of the consultant.

Clients may worry about the

professionalism of the consultant and his honesty.

They might also

wonder If the consultant %wuld protect the organisation's Interests
by not trying to steal key Individuals from other organizations, or
releasing Information to competitors,^^
of a consultant a client must ask:

When contemplating the use

Is this consultant a professional

In whom I may repose trust and confidence, or Is he a self-serving,
untrustworthy Individual whom I will regard as an o u t s i d e r ? I n
the Army, a client Is more apt to view the consultant with suspicion.
As a result, the commander In need of an OESO may very well hesitate
to request his aid.
For one to understand the problems and concerns of the client
concerning confidentiality, one must understand the climate of
organizational leadership In the United States Army,
In 1971 the U.S. Army Wér College conducted a study entitled
Leadership for the 1970*s .
study portrayed —

One of the major themes throughout the
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The ambitious, transitory commander^-marglnally
skilled In the compleâdtlee of his duties-^
engulfed In producing statistical results, fear
ful of personal failures, too busy to talk vlth
or listen to his subordinates, and determined to
submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect
faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the
expense of the sweat and frustrations of his sub
ordinates .
Some Army officers are so Interested In their careers that they
would sacrifice their Integrity In order to enhance their career and
personal goals.

There are four Issues that bear consideration con

cerning careerism:
(1)
%rrong."

Ethical relativism.

This Is "the blurring of right and

In other words, the end justifies thé means.

This prob

lem Is most eloquently explained by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L.
Savage In their book titled. Crisis In Command— Klsmanagement In the
Army.
It seems clear that the exaggerated emphasis upon
careerism to the point of acquiescing in almost
every policy without opposition could only have
happened In a military structure which has con
sistently failed to develop an ethical doctrine
of resistance. Accordingly, such shorthand injunc
tions as 'It all counts for twenty,' 'don't rock
the boat,' 'you can't tell the general that,' while
often destructive, were useful attitudes for
Individual career advancement. To be sure, ad
vancement Is then purchased at the expense of a
failure to examine higher orders virtually regard
less of operational consequence.^^
(2)

Loyalty.

Often loyalty can mean "when a genuine, whole

some loyalty to the boss degenerates Into covering

for him, hiding

things from him, or not differing with him when he Is wrong."
C3)

"Ethical trap problem."
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"What becomes Important Is how
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things are perceived, rather than hmr they really are,"^^
(4)

"Drive for snccess."

Sncceea can come at the cost of

one's own moral and ethical convictions, and at the cost of dis37
loyalty to subordinates.

The drive for success perpetuates it

self, and officers coming up the hierarchical ladder will mirror the
standards of their predecessors.

Gabriel and Savage

state:

••.the present climate does not appear to be selfcorrecting. The human drives for success and for
recognition by seniors, sustained if not inflamed
by the systems of rewards and management which
cater to immediate personal success at the expense
of a long term consolidation of moral and ethical
strength would appear to perpetuate if not exacer
bate the current environment. Time alone will not
cure the disease. The fact alone that the leaders
of the future are those who survived and excelled
within the rules of the present system militates in
part against any self-starting Incremental return
toward the practical application of ideal values.
A m y officers and the units they command are very competitive
toward each other, and careerism is one reason ccnpetition is so
prevalent.

Units are in conq>etition almost every day.

Competition

can be observed in numerous ways and can center on which unit has the
fewest AWOLs, the most reenlistments, and the best tactical scores.
Positive competition is both healthy and desirable, but competi
tion in the Army, as in all organizations, can also produce some harm
ful effects.

Concerning competition, Rensis and James Likert state:

"It can cause a 'win at all cost' syndrome in which leaders become
authoritarian, creative problem solving is minimal, disagreement is
not allowed, and communication distortion is prevalent."
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Also,

"Win-lose confrontation intensifies the hostile, bitter attitudes
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that the confHctjUig parties hold toward each other,
The Anoy^muat stop the harmfnl competitiveness that is so
common among Army officers and the imits that they command.

One

way of attacking this problem is to stop relying on statistics to
Judge the effectiveness of the commander and his unit.

Instead of

using statistics to Judge unit efficiency, the hi^-level commander
must initiate goal-setting and management by objectives to determine
unit preparedness and efficiency.

Commanders at all levels must

adopt a system of managing described by Likert as System 4:
The human organization of a System 4 firm is made
up of Interlocking work groups with a h i ^ degree
of group loyalty among thé members and favorable
attitudes and trust among peers, siq>eriors, and
subordinates. Consideration for others and
relatively high levels of skill in personal inter
action, group problem solving, and other group
functions also are present. These skills permit
effective participation in decisions on common
problems. Participation is used, for example, to
establish organizational objectives which are a
satisfactory integration of the needs and desires
of all the members of the organization and of per
sons functionally related to it. Members of the
organization are highly motivated to achieve the
organization's goals. High levels of reciprocal
influence occur, and high levels of total coordinated
influence are achieved in the organization. Communica
tion is efficient and effective. There is a flow from
one part of the organization to another of all the
relevant information important for each decision and
action. The leadership in the organization has
developed a highly effective social system for inter
action, problem solving, mutual influence, and organi
zational achievement. This leadership is technically
competent and holds high performance goals.
In summary, confidentiality of the OESO's documentation and
findings is a key consideration in the success of OE,

Because of Army

officers' career aspirations, their conçetitive nature, and the

25
organizational climate they work In, they are not likely to request
OESO consultation If they believe their Inept management practices
will be released to higher authorities.
Evaluation of the Four Step Process
3.

If there Is a breakdown In one of the four OE steps. It Is

necessary to find out where It normally occurs and why.

It Is sus

pected that the assessment stage Is relatively easy to do, but once
the client becomes cognizant of his problems and the time required to
solve them, he may not wish to go further.

The assessment stage can

also be a problem, however, because the client may be less than open
with the OESO, and the true problems of the organization may not be
detected.

The client may also feel that once he knows the problems

he can solve them himself and has no need for OESO expertise.
Finally, It Is possible that the OESO Is good at assessing problems
In the organization, but has difficulty In planning solutions.
Organizational Effective Staff Officers who responses to the
questionnaire stated that they spent the following percentage of time
on their various duties.
23.1%

Assessment

20.6%

Implementation

12.8%

Planning

13.3%

Building User Relationships

8.2%

Professional Development

7.7%

Teaching and Other OE Related Duties

7.3%

Scouting and Contracting

7.0%

Evaluation
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According to the respondents of the questionnaire, OESOs
would prefer spending more time In the Implementation stage.
Thlrty-'slx percent of those responding Indicated Implementation as
their first preference.

Q e e below a list of preferred OE

activity.
Preferred Activity

Ranked 1st By

Implementation

36.8%

Assessment

11%9%

Building Client
Relationships

11.9%

Planning

10.3%

Professional Develop
ment

9.2%

Teaching

4.3%

Evaluation

2.2%

Scouting and Con
tracting

1.6%

Non-OE Mission Duties

1.1%

Administrative Duties

0%

According to the following chart, the assessment and planning
stage are the most likely periods when the four-step process seems
to start deteriorating.
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THE OE STEPS
Always O )

Usually (4)
*o

I
•H
Sometimes (3)

I
%
SM

Seldom (2)

4>
Q
Almost Never
Q)

i i
Assessment

Planning

Implementation

Evaluation

Successful OPNS
^ ^ 2 2 3 Unsuccessful OPNS
Source: Directorate of Evaluation, United States Army Organizational
Effectiveness Center and School, Evaluation, 1979, p« 11*'

Unsuccessful OE operations are more common at the assessment
and planning stages due to the nature of Army officers.

That is,

once commanders have decided to go into OE implementation, they have
convinced themselves of the benefits of the entire OE operation, and
have made a definite commitment to the program.
The agent for change must be the client, the consultant's role
is only to advise and to encourage change in organizational effective
ness.

Warner Burke believes that although the role of the consultant

is si^posed to be an advisor, he often takes on the role of the
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client and Is more of an ’’agent of c h a n g e . I n
possibility of this happening is slight.

the Army the

Managers/commanders feel

strongly about their command position and trill not relinquish any
managerial prerogatives.

When the OESO attempts too strongly to be

the agent of change, he is apt to be unsuccessful in the assessment
and planning stages.
Organizational effectiveness staff officers prefer the
implementation stage rather than the assessment and planning stage.
This could indicate that they feel uncomfortable with these stages
and have a difficult time obtaining the cooperation of the com
mander/ client. A commander and his subordinates may well be less
than open with the OESO as to the real problems of the organization.
If the assessment stage is to be successful, the OESO must ana
lyze the present needs of the unit.

He must determine the present

level of performance and who the key trainers are, determine the
organizational climate, analyze the procedures of the unit, and
assess policy and decision-making p r o c e d u r e s . W h e n the commander
and his subordinates are not open with the OESO concerning these
areas, the assessment and planning stage will be unsuccessful.
Key elements must be present in order for successful changes to
take place in the organizational climate of the Army.

Bennis states

that there are three essential elements that must be present for
successful organizational change,
(1)

The client (commander) should understand the con

sequence of change and have equal influence in developing the
change.

Additionally, it is extremely important that the client have
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a great deal of faith In the ability of the c o n s u l t a n t . A major
problem concerning the success of an OE operation, then, Is that
the commander may not have any faith In the OESO.

That Is not to

say that the OESO Is net competent, but because of the Army's rank
structure, and the prevailing feeling that commanders and senior
officers are always right, the OESO may not be viewed as an equal,
or as competent as they are.

Consequently, the OESO cannot be an

effective Initiator of change.
The change agent can be crucial In reducing the
resistance to change. As long as the change
agent acts congruently with the principles of
the program and as long as the client has a
chance to test competence and motives (his o%m
and the change agent's), the agent should be
able to provide the psychological support so
necessary during the risky phases of change.
As I have stressed again and again, the quality
of the client-agent relationship is pivotal to
the success of the change program.
C2)

"The change effort should be perceived as being as

self-motivated and voluntary as possible."**

Bennis says that this

can be accomplished by having the support and backing of top manage
ment.^^

Here we can detect another problem.

Amqr top management

may view OE as "soft management" and look down on commanders who
request OE.

Also, OESOs may not have the training and experience

necessary to rationally persuade commanders to change their managerial
style of leadership.
C3)

Bennis believes the program of change "must Include

emotional and value as well as cognitive Information elemen ts for
successful Implementation."^^

To rely on "rational persuasion" Is
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not enough^ a change must appeal to group sense of justice and fairness.
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It Is Believed that most officers are just and fair, But

because of the rampant careerism prevailing In the Army, It Is doubt
ful that officers can totally support a program of change as far
reaching as OE.
Army Organizations That Require OE
4.

It Is Important to ascertain at what level of the Army's

organization the OESO Is most often requested.

If this Is known,

then the OESO can be trained In problem areas peculiar to that
organizational level.

Also Important to know Is why a particular

level of the Army's organization Is more apt to request OE con
sultation than others.
The response to the survey Indicated that OE clients tended to
be located at Battalion level.
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This would seem understandable,

for most Army activity functions are concentrated at that level.
Battalions are large e n o u ^ to maneuver Independently and are
separate entitles of organization, hierarchy, and command.

When work

flows down from Division It normally rests with the Battalions to
accomplish It.

As a result, OE Is most often requested at Battalion

level due to Its tremendous work load, and Its problems Inherent in
accomplishing the %fork.
If most of the problems and needs for OE are found at Bat
talion level, perhaps this Is where the OESOs should be located.
The opposite Is the case however, the majority of OESOs are located
at Division level and none of them are located at Battalion.

It Is
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apparent that the primary reason for this is that there are not
enough trained OESOs to work at Battalion, and that they must be
requested at Division.
The Army is aware of this shortcoming, and, according to offi
cials at Fort Ord, there is a short OE course provided for Battalion
Personnel Officers (S^l) to help them to understand the concepts and
general aspects of OE.

This short course helps both the Battalion

Commander and the S-1 gain some knowledge of OE and therefore
creates a more favorable climate for the OESO and the OE program In
general.
Because we now know where OE is generally requested, perhaps
an organizational model suited for a Battalion would prove most
beneficial.

Such a model should consider the formal organizational

structure, technology, style of leadership, personal systems (abili
ties, intelligence, personality traits, values, and beliefs) and
goals of the formal organization.
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OE Request for Command Transition
5.

There are certain areas in which clients most often request

the assistance of an OESO.

Sixty-one percent of the OESOs reported

that the primary issue confronting them was command transition.

In

other %/ords, 61 percent of the OE consultant roles deal with the
transition of a new commander to a u n i t I t

is interesting to note

that the majority of key managers feel that OESOs deal best with the
issue concerning command transitions.^^
Do these statistics have any meaning?

Certainly they must.
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Organizational effectiveness la a till extremely new to the Army and
Its hierarchy.

It la still viewed as "soft management" by many Army

officers at all levels; consequently» there Is a stigma attached to
an officer requesting and using the program.

If, for instance, a

Battalion Commander has been In his position for six months and
requests OE consulting, he la going to have to justify Its use to
his superior, peers, and subordinates.

There Is a stigma attached

to requesting OE, for It Implies that the commander has failed In
some aspect of management, something no manager likes to do.

As

already stated, due to the "system" officers are careful to hide
organizational problems for fear that their efficiency will be
questioned.
Then why is there less stigma attached to OE command transi
tion consulting as the statistics lzq)ly?

Because of the nature of

the Army's organization, command transition Is considered a trauma
to all Involved.

It means a new commander with different likes and

dislikes, a new way of operating and a new organizational climate.
No superior, peer, or subordinate will criticize a new commander when
he requests the consulting role of an OESO for command transition,
for It lessens the trauma for all, and no stigma Is attached to Its
use.
From the above discussion, It can be Inferred that there

Is a

stigma attached when requesting OESOs, but the stigma Is less

of a

one when used for command transition. Based on OD S3q>erlence

all Is

not hopeless,

however, for when

OE has been operational for alonger

period of time, and Individuals have been educated to its benefits.
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OE will be used for all purposes with, less stigma attached to its
utilization*
Types of Implexgentation Most Often Used
6t

It night be useful to determine what type of implementation

is normally used by the OESO.

The responses to the survey indicated

that the top five implementation techniques are action planning,
transition model, communication, team building, and problem
s o l v i n g . F r o m this, it can be deduced that these five areas can
generally be considered the major problems in the managerial and
organizational structure of the Anxqr,
Inq)lementation encompasses a large spectrum of consideration
and no one can predict consistently what type of implementation is
always required.

",..the field has developed largely in reaction to

changes in society and organizations rather than as a result of
deliberate planning."
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Following are some key considerations

dealing with implementation in general, with some salient points con
cerning the Army’s OE program.
Cl)

If implementation is to be useful, the OESO must

take four organizational variables into consideration.
sider people, task, structure, and technology.

He must con

This is of utmost

importance, for to change one variable will certainly cause an effect
on another.

Harold J. Leavitt says concerning the four variables:
These four are highly Independent, so that
change in any one will most probably result
in conçensatory Cor retaliatory) change in
others. In discussing organizational change,
therefore, I shall assume that it is one or
more of these variables that we seek to
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change. Sonettves vè may aim to change one
of these as an end In itself, sometimes as a
mechanism for affecting some changes in one
or more of the others,*9
A major problem for the OESO and the client, then, is that they
are often able to change the people variable, but only the hierarchy
has the authority to change the structure, task, and tools.

Conse

quently, until the OESO and the client can take a more positive role
in the three remaining aspects of implementation and change, OE will
be an uphill battle.
It is important for the Army's hierarchy that OE officials
analyze the structure and technology of Army units.

As one OD

author put it:
One concept of organization development calls
for change in both technology and structure,.,
and/or change in individuals and their inter
action processes...rather than for efforts to
change only the people, only the structure
process, or only the technology of the organiza
tion.*0
One aspect of OE that is not discussed much in the Army and
could possibly open up a whole new concept of Army bureaucracy is the
possibility of changing the bureaucratic and personnel structure of
the Army organization.

This paper cannot attempt to discuss this

aspect of OE at any length, but it may be the cause of some of the
Army's major management problems.

"OD means that practitioners must

pay considerably more attention to industrial engineering, job
design or re—design, and the whole area of socio-technical systems.
C2)

An inherent problem with OE is that it may be ini

tiated and utilized at one level in the command, but not higher up.
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Many organizational proBlena^originate.at the next higher level of
management «
A programmer may he designed to train the lover
levels of management and may omit the higher
levels, whose faults will consequently appear
greater In the eyes of those whom they control.
This Is a good way of producing rebellion.
C3)
building.

One of the most Important aspects of OE Is team

Team building Is "...Intended to make a group effective

and achieve unity of purpose.

The Araqr, like most large

organizations, normally has staff and line personnel vying for
power, control, and prestige.

The purpose of team building Is to

eliminate this Internal conflict, and encourage people to work
together for a common goal.

Team building should be the first step

In an OE Implementation program; without It all other programs may
well fall.

Patten and Vail say:
...successful team building efforts which
e3q>and self-awareness, laq>rove the Individual's
self-concept, diffuse openness, and enable
solving and decision-making In a group situa
tion are fundamental to starting on strategic
OD, launching an MBO effort, or enabling the
rewards system In an organization to act as
an Incentive for performance.^^

Few organizations Implement OD by proceeding on a step-bystep basis with team building as the first s t a g e . T h e Army Is no
different, they often Implement various aspects of OE without first
promoting team building.
G»)

Management by objectives (MBO) has been a common word

In the Army for almost a decade.

Management by objectives Is a

method of bringing together personal and organizational goals In
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order to create a oneneaa, a tô m o a purpose, and a way of achieving
"...satisfaction of hlgher^level ego and self^ctuallzatlon needs.
Until the recent adoption of OE By the Army, MBO functioned in
only one way.

Goals were selected By the unit commander, often with

little Interaction or input from others.
everyone else attempted to meet them.

He selected the goals and

Perhaps the reasons for this

are that the unit commander felt he was the most qualified individual
to determine goals, or he did not have an organisation that functioned
as a team.

Perhaps now, with the emphasis on OE and the inq>ortance

attached to team building, MBO may finally work.
(5)

Job enrichment (JE) is the least used and asked for

method of implementation in the Army^s OE p r o g r a m . W h a t does this
mean?

Does it mean that all jobs in the Army are so enriched that it

is not a problem, or does it mean that OESOs and conaanders can find
few ways to enrich the duties, responsibilities, and functions of
its soldiers and officers?

This is perhaps a major question that

should be asked by all who are interested in having a well trained
and professional Army, capable of fulfilling its primary mission—
that of defending the United States.

Let us assume that the answer

to the question just posed is that OESOs and commanders can find few
ways to enrich the jobs of their personnel, and then let us try to
determine why.

Some of the following reasons may be:
CL)

Commanders are not humanistic and have little

real concern for the needs of people, other than the basic needs.
C2)

CoiBBianders are too used to the command and

obedience style of management, and they cannot change their method
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of operating.

They have functioned this way for years, and it has

obtained for then promotions, security, and increasingly important
jobs.
C3)

Army managers normally serve in command posi

tions for only a short time Q

or 2 years), while the soldier and

NCO may work in the same Job for a number of years.

The Army Com

mander, in the short time he has, must be successful, make a name
for himself, receive an outstanding efficiency report, eventually
get promoted, and then move on to other duties.

In the short time

that he commands, he has little time, even if he were inclined to,
to enrich the Jobs of people he controls.
If we believe that 'both JE and
MBO are fundamentally grounded on
self-control and humanistic notions.
Both can become Important corner
stones of OD and bases for entirely
new styles of organizational manage
ment.**
The Evaluation Stage
6.

It is important to determine what evaluation indicators are

used by the OESO to understand his success in an OE case.
a number of indicators that can determine this.

There are

The key point, how

ever, is that there seem to be myriad ways OESOs attempt to determine
whether or not their OE efforts have been successful, and none of
them seem to be used with any particular effectiveness.
The lack of effective methods for determining OE successes is a
major shortcoming of OE.

The survey showed that 160 OESOs used

client's comments 8.6 percent of the time to determine the effective
ness of their OE actions.

"Cut feelings" were used by 151 OESOs
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11.7 percent of the time.
4.4 percent of the time.

Interviews were nsed by 140 OESOs only
Other evaluation Indicators were shown,

hut there seemed to he no trend or systematic method for evaluating
OE operations.
If OESOs and managers cannot effectively evaluate OE opera
tions , they will not realize what they have, or have not, accom
plished.

If an evaluation system Is not utilized "...managers will

often think ahout what they have failed to achieve. Instead of
remembering the positive effects.

The provision of positive

Information can result In a powerful reinforcement to further
action."70
Another important consideration of the evaluation stage Is that
It should he planned well In advance.

In fact, the type of evalua

tion and what Is to he evaluated should be considered prior to the
implementation stage; that way a more effective analysis of the
problem can be made.

"The follow-up has not been clearly foreseen

In designing the training stage.

In fact, many programs have been

launched In the pious hope that some benefits must surely follow if
the seeds of wisdom are strewn.

Sometimes this is true, but is the

pay-off maximal?"
The above discussion highlights a key problem area of the
Army's OE program.

The Army must better plan for the evaluation

stage, formulate the stage well in advance in order to pinpoint
objectives, and develop à more formulated evaluation plan or model
than the haphazard method they are now using.
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Traijalng of the PESO
7.

Organizational Effective Staff Officers attend 16 weeks of

Intensive training on OE,

One nust, however, ask If this Is enough

training for the OESO to perform thé myriad duties that hé must
perform.
Asstalng an OESO Is Intelligent, sincere, Interested In his
duties, and has grasped all of the OE training. Is It still enough?
Organizational Development consultants In the civilian field
normally will have had years of experience behind them and usually
will have worked for a large firm where additional expertise Is
available,
To compound the problem even more, an OESO performs his duties
for three or four years and then moves on to other assignments.

In

other words, the OESO, regardless of his sincerity, intelligence,
and professionalism, Is still a novice.

"The novice can bring

specialized knowledge and skills to a client, but an inexperienced
consultant is often unable to reduce risk for the client and, in
many cases, may actually Increase the probability of failure."
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According to the survey "OESO graduates appear to be most
satisfied with the emphasis on group processes and the four-step
process while they generally disagree that the course needs more
enq)hasls on self-directed study and didactic Instruction."^^
When OESOs were asked in the survey If the OECS adequately pre
pared them, most agreed that they were adequately prepared for the
assessment, planning, and tnq>lamentation stage.

Ironically, most

felt that they were inadequately prepared for the evaluation stage.
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The evaluation stage (#e discussed on pages 37 and 38) requires
additional educational Instruction«
In summary, the training and experience level of the OESO Is
somewhat suspect.

The system of procuring relatively Junior officers

as Internal consultants In the U.S, Army Is net the best possible
system.

More will be said about this later in the recommendation

section.
Senior Officers' Concepts of OE
8.
lem.

The OESO's Interactions with senior officers is a prob

"A summary of the factors contributing to OE Ineffectiveness"

...lists lack of senior officer support and lack of acceptance as
the two major problem areas."^^
Many senior officers who view OE with suspicion are those who
have had little or no exposure to Its concepts, Importance, and
rewards.

They believe that the concepts are Idealistic values

about human nature and are not totally proven, or that it is just
a nice idea to make people feel good.
Those officers who style their whole managerial and leadership
role on the command and obedience role must find ways of changing.
"In other words, we have a field of OD today because a centuriesold leadership style (command and obedience) has become obsolete,
The authoritarian approach to management and leadership that most
senior officers were exposed to 20 or 30 years ago no longer works.
Given the nature of social systems In thé m o d e m
organizational world, the command/obedience style
of management Is less and less appropriate to
changing an organization since research shows that
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this style has high, probability of producing un
intended consequences that are often Inimical to
the goals of the change.
The problem, as it no%r stands, is that there are too many
senior officers mho have never been exposed to the concepts of OE,
and they vlev it as needless and worthless.
Some officers in the group of 06 and above do
not believe they need OE assistance and the
hard sell approach to OE may be counter
productive with these officers. OESOs must
look for target of opportunities that directly
address the most serious management problem
perceived by that group. These senior officers
think they are good leaders and their career
success attests to this fact. The impact of
the lack of use of OE by senior officers is
noted by subordinates in their chain of com
mand and consequently OE is not used %yithin
their organization. This Is an area that needs
further study and refinement of how best to
approach this group of officers. Some of these
officers tend to look on the OESO as a quality
and valuable resource who could be better
utilized In a regular Army line unit position.
Too many senior officers today use the power and coercion
models of leadership as their primary method of achieving results.
If they can be taught to change this style, and adopt what Is called
the consensus and insight model of managing, they would have a far
more productive organization.
The consensus and insight model is based on the
concept that once people who work together gain
Insight into the fundamental dynamics of human
relationships In a context of purposive Joint
effort, they are ready to Implement problem
solving approaches...based on an understanding
and agreement.
Additionally, "we too often assume that organization change Is for
'those people downstairs,' %yho are somehow perceived as less
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Q1
Intelligent and leas productive than ^those upstairs.
Senior officers too often feel that change is good for those
below them, but not necessary for them.

They fall to realize that

they are frequently the cause of organizational malfunctions.

Addi

tionally, they believe that because of their high position they are
the most intelligent and hnowledgeable individuals, and should,
therefore, make all decisions.

Because of the problem discussed

above, most Army officers hesitate to be open with superiors, and
at times, even with subordinates.

The reason for this is inherent

in the nature of the hierarchy, its command structure, its per
formance appraisal system, and a "can do" attitude at all costs.
Senior officers must be "aware that the real danger to group
effectiveness is not in the 'explosions' which people believe may
result when they bring problems into the open, but in the inertia
which results from evading problem situations."

43
Section V
RecôMBBèndatlona and Concilia Iona
1.

All officers most Be educated in the concepts of OE.

The

Army la trying to accomplish this By teaching OE at all officers*
schools and service colleges.
Be senior officers.

The primary target area, however, must

These officers must Be encouraged to adopt OE,

for if the Army is to change its concept and style of management,
those in the hierarchy must initiate the change.

This will not Be

easy to accomplish as GaBriel and Savage point out.
Major institutional changes are usually fiercely
resisted in all organizations since reform means
a change in Both the status quo and the anticipated
status quo, each of which guarantees the personal
career Investments and eaq>ectations of large
numBers of people, in this case high-ranking offi
cers. It is a fact of political experience, and
all armies are political, that when reform is not
puBllcly resisted it is often Bureaucratically
and covertly sabotaged, so that the shadow of change
is often projected while the substance of organiza
tional vested interest remains intact. Elites do
not easily relinquish their power, prestige, and
income, nor do individuals readily repudiate personal
histories. No one who has examined the proliferation
of federal agencies, their redundance, their in
effectiveness, and often their irrelevancy and some
times malignancy can escape this conclusion. The
history of political and governmental reform is not
a happy one.®^
Only with time, education, and perhaps direction from civilian
authority can the Army change its style of leadership and management.
There is no easy or quick solution for changing the attitude of its
senior officers.

It will take time and effort to affect change.

The rewards, however, will be most gratifying, for if the Army can
become an organization that is innovative in its leadership and
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managerial style, support from external sources in society is
likely.

Even more beneficial, the internal structure will be more

productive, efficient, and capable of fulfilling its mission.
2.

Confidentiality of OESO's findings is going to be a major

problem in time to come.

Some of the more senior officers believe

that findings and documentations of the OESO's work should be turned
over to superiors.

They claim that the advantage of this is that

problems inherent in the total structure of the organization may be
solved, rather than just those of a subordinate unit^

Additionally,

organizational members will see the OE effort as an integrated and
coordinated program.
The disadvantages of this approach, however, outweigh the advan
tages.

If OE is to be successful in the A m y , documentation and

information obtained by the OESO must be kept in strictest confidence.
Because of the nature of the Army's hierarchy and management system
of rating officer performance, no other way is possible.
It is, therefore, recommended that OESO documentation be kept
confidential, and that the Army continue to circulate case studies
for managers and commanders to keep abreast of current leadership
problems throughout the Army.

It is interesting to note that all

OESOs interviewed feel that their documentation concerning OE activ
ities should be kept in strictest confidence between them and their
clients.
3.

It is recommended that senior officers stop relying on

statistics to measure a commander's worth.

Mutually agreed upon
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objectives must be given true meaning Instead of "lip service."
When this occurs, officer» will be more apt to Be open and honest
with superiors.

Additionally, the use of performance objectives,

which means that the superior and subordinate mutually agree on
objectives and standards to Be met, would de-emphaslze careerism.
4.
stage.

The OECS and OESO must give more impetus to the evaluation
By doing this they will be better able to judge correctly

the success of OE operations.

Additionally, by planning the

evaluation method early In the planning stage, OESOs and clients
will Be better able to establish goals and use them to measure the
OE operation.
5.

Any successful OE operation will depend on the ability of

the OESO.

As stated earlier, the majority of OESOs are Intelligent,

capable, and truly Interested In doing the best possible job.

Due

to their lack of rank and experience In the Army, the OESO's major
problem Is dealing with more senior commanders.

This lack of rank

and experience cannot help but be a hindrance In their effectiveness
as a consultant to superior officers.
If OE Is to be more than just applying formulas, and Is to
become a method of changing behavioral patterns of managing, then
the OESO must have a rank equal to or above that of the client In
order to effectively persuade the client to change his leadership
style.

A captain, or major, will have very little Influence when

dealing with more senior officers.
As stated earlier, there are many senior officers who function
with the authoritarian style of leadership, and are unwilling, or
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perhaps unable to change.

There are, however, many senior officers

who are Innovative In the techniques of managing.
Considering the above discussion, the following recommendstIon
Is made:

That senior officers close to retirement who have proven

their worth as excellent officers, be given the option of extending
their length of service, and be trained and then assigned to OE
duties.
A similar recommendation, but for other reasons, has been formu
lated by Gabriel and Savage.
Ideally, no such person would act In organiza
tional parallel with former peers and friends...
None would ever be eligible for promotion, decora
tion, public citation, or any singular honor;
they would serve in the anonymity traditional to
the German general staff officer.*
These OE officers would not be "yes" men perpetually Interested
In furthering their own careers.

Their records would be carefully

scrutinized. Insuring they were the type of Individuals who were of
the Independent and honest type.

They would be the type of officers

who had never feared to speak out In opposition to a superior when
the need arose, even If their ratings for efficiency and Integrity
were at stake.

"The selection of these men would be difficult.

Possibly a detailed examination of records might reveal men who never
lied, who demonstrated genuine creativity during their service, and
who stood up for their men."®^
If this recommendation were followed, the Army's system, their
"yes" men, and the careerism Inherent In the organization would not
affect these senior OEs.
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Here then le a groop of cuetodlans none of whom
le pénanent; their aaelgnnents could not he
self-perpetuating; all final selections after
screening vould he at random; the men chosen
could not he promoted, decorated, or honored;
they could not have a career. Such men would
have little likely Interest In corrupting the
sysgyn and every likely Interest In Improving

Other benefits derived from this recommendation were found by
the %ero% Corporation.

They have used selected senior executives

who were about to retire, or who did retire were recalled, as con
sultants for organizational development.

%erox found that these men

were much better able to Identify with the problems of the client;
consequently, the client was far more open and honest with the con
sultant.

If the Army’s hierarchy will support the concept of senior

pre-retirement officers as OE consultants, the chance of OE developing
Into a more worthwhile and productive program will be vastly en
hanced.
Without top management support and without con
sultants with proven track records as managers,
a practice such as Xerox’s is questionable. If
they see them as over the hill, some managers
might avoid using preretirement executives. Yet
companies that do use their executives’ accumu
lated wisdom can gain a resource edge over their
competition.
Organizational Effectiveness In
as it Is

now structured.

the Army will have some

Statistics have already shown this

the case.
Evidence Indicates that Organizational Effective
ness COE) Is beginning to pay off within the Army.
Significant findings clearly show that units using
OE had higher levels of unit effectiveness and open
communication than units that did not. Reports of

success
tobe
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recent appllcetions of OE to such key Issues as reealistaents, retention, and conmander transition
have documented sieasuraBle cost benefits as veil as
Improved readiness, In addition, trends Indicate
that unite using OE had higher levels of job satis
faction and commitment, OE usage has Increased from
40 percent in 1978 to 58 percent In 1979.8*
It Is strongly recommended that to make OE a truly effective program
to rectify thé managerial and organizational problems of the Army,
the changes suggested In this paper be Instituted.
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